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Changing Academic Requirements for Lawyers - Yes
Please!
 
The Law Admissions Consultative
Committee ('LACC') has called for
submissions in its review of the
academic requirements for
admission to legal profession in
Australia ('Review'). The Review is
the latest in a series of
discussions and mini-reviews over
the past decade or so about
Australian admission
requirements. This has occurred
largely against the background of
calls by the judiciary for more
emphasis on statutory
interpretation in Australian law
schools. The sequence of events:
reports, submissions,
recommendations etc as to
statutory interpretation is
canvassed in the Review.
At the same time, the Australian Productivity Commission has handed down a report into
access to justice ('Report'). Chapter seven of the Report covers legal education and makes
recommendations including that the Priestley 11 be reviewed (recommendation 7.1). The
Priestley 11 are the core academic requirements for admission to practice in Australia, and
must be taught by a law school to become an accredited degree.
The Report and the Review are interesting to read together. While obviously they are
addressing different purposes, they contain inconsistencies that perhaps lay bare the
conflicted status of the law degree. I might observe that Margaret Thornton has been
exposing this for some decades now.
In this post I will focus on the LACC Review. In particular I respond to some of the questions
it poses about the academic requirements. As a starting point though, I will outline the
conflicts inherent in the very notion of legal education.
Both the LACC Review and the Productivity Commission Report implicitly engage with the
idea of a legal education. The Report examines three tiers of education - university,
practical legal training ('PLT') and continuing professional development ('CPD'). The Review
on the other hand is focused on the law degree, whether undergraduate (LLB) or
postgraduate (JD) and the academic requirements. It briefly identifies areas of PLT that
build on assumed knowledge, derived from the law degree itself. (For information on PLT,
see PleagleTrainer Blog.) 
What is academic legal education? 
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In questioning the areas of knowledge contained within the academic requirements
(Priestley 11), the Review starts with the premise on which the Priestley 11 were developed:
is the area of such basic potential importance to the great majority of
practitioners today that no law graduate should be permitted to practise
without it?
Accordingly, the Review is premised on the idea of 'basic potential importance...for
practice'.  The first observation I make, and one that underpins the discussion below, is that
this premise is, with the greatest respect, of limited utility. This is so for two reasons.
The first is the ever-changing role of lawyers and the diversity of practice. A criminal lawyer
has no potential importance for practice of equity. A transactional lawyer has no potential
importance for practice of evidence. This approach might serve the employment market so
that a graduate can be ready for any law job that comes along (so admittedly it would have
potential importance). But a graduate whose ambition lies in criminal law need not endure
the remaining subject areas. This focus can be considered to represent not service to the
profession or society, but an individual utilitarian purpose.
As noted in the Review,
both the range of legal practice and the proportion of lawyers practising
primarily in a limited, specialised area of law, rather than in general practice,
appear to have increased. For some, these changes challenge both the
contemporary relevance of the question underlying the present Academic
Requirements and the validity of the choices then made. 
Therefore the minimum requirements would always be under review, ostensibly reflecting
'market' conditions without tending to the real question, of what is the basic level of
knowledge that distinguishes the lawyer from any other profession. 
This relates to the second reason for questioning the basis for selection of academic
requirements. On what basis can we justify all law graduates having a minimum 'spread' of
knowledge, when we cannot predict 'potential' utility for that student, nor shifts in the
needs of the profession and the public? I suggest that there is a 'coherent core of discipline
knowledge' that represents what it means to be a lawyer. Knowledge in which the lawyer
need not be proficient in practice, but which demonstrates an appreciation of the fabric of
the legal system and its components. Knowledge that broadly and perhaps unconsciously
informs the practitioner's practice in diverse areas. Knowledge that differentiates a
professional from a tradesperson: a legal practitioner from a conveyancer.
I focus in this post on the Review, the Review is cognisant of the Productivity Commission
Report. It is worth making a couple of observations about the Report.
While the Review is concerned with the academic requirements, the Report seems to merge
academic requirements of knowledge and its manipulation, with skills. On page 253 for
example, it cites two submissions that promote the need for graduates to have a set of
practice skills. The interviewees state that there is 'a lot that will probably be irrelevant to
your day-to-day work'. Indeed I know of few lawyers practising constitutional law. But that is
no argument against its inclusion in the academic requirements.
The Report likewise celebrates clinical legal education as a 'focused, practical and intensive
method of learning' (page 248). There is a lot of evidence to show that this is the case. I
disagree though that this goes to the heart of an academic education. It effects contextual
training, to be sure.
as [students] work their way through law school and black letter law they will
also at the same time have an understanding about ... the real-life practice of
law and the need to treat your clients as consumers as opposed to separate
clients.
It is somewhat ironic to read this glowing support of clinical legal education in light of the
profession's dismantling of the previous system of articles of clerkship.
The emphasis of the Report is on meeting a market for practice-ready lawyers. This may well
be central in considering PLT and CPD, and as the Report observes, these areas with
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academic education are together relevant in considering the education of lawyers. But I'm
not convinced that this is the purpose of legal education in its academic sense. And this is
the context for the discussion in the LACC Review. 
Should any or all of the following areas of knowledge be omitted from the
Academic Requirements: Civil Procedure; Company Law; Evidence; Ethics and
Professional Responsibility? 
If so, why? 
It is submitted that the discipline areas of evidence and ethics and professional
responsibility are essential components of the coherent body of discipline knowledge that
represents what it means to be a lawyer. As discussed above, this is the criterion I prefer to
the utility of a field to potential practice. 
Evidence 
While the law of evidence is only ever ‘needed in practice’ by litigation lawyers, the
concepts of evidence reveal the essential workings of the justice system. As all lawyers are
officers of the court (even if they do not practice in the courts), it goes to the essence of
the lawyer that they will understand the management of information that founds the
litigation process. 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
While it is noted that ethics is also dealt with in practical legal training, this discipline area
also lies at the heart of understanding the profession and its relationship with the judicial
arm of government. As with evidence, ethics relates to the nature of the profession itself. It
is more than simply a list of rules that govern practice, and encompasses the role of the
profession and the practitioner in society. It therefore supports the coherent body of
discipline knowledge that distinguishes the lawyer from any other profession. While the
principles of ethics are central to all professions, the function of the law as a system is
founded upon these principles. Professional responsibility builds on a broader understanding
of ethics to encompass duties to the court that differentiate the law from other professions.
This subject area represents also the opportunity to engage students in developing a sense
of professional identity, known to be a crucial aspect of student engagement and in shaping
the practitioner. While there are other ways in which to develop professional identity, in
light of the role of lawyers in the administration of justice there is a strong argument that
this subject is a crucial bridge between the student and the profession in terms of academic
knowledge but also in personal and professional development. 
It is however submitted that the academic requirement of ethics need not include trust
accounting. This is a practical endeavour properly taught in the context of practical legal
training. 
Civil Procedure 
Civil procedure is to be distinguished from evidence in terms of forming an essential aspect
of discipline knowledge. Civil procedure arguably represents a more applied aspect of the
discipline, not necessary to a global view of ‘the law’. While it lies at the centre of
management of the courts and the litigation within them, it does not represent the heart of
discipline knowledge in the same way as evidence. The practical aspects of civil procedure
are addressed in the practical legal training standards. 
Company Law 
The Productivity Commission reports that 57 per cent of solicitors practice in property and
commercial law (p238). This appears to suggest that statistically, knowledge of company law
may well be ‘needed (or potentially needed) in practice’. Certainly the growth of companies
in the economy has been exponential and it would be rare to find a practitioner in private
practice who had not encountered one.
It is noted that these statistics are limited to civil law (ie non-criminal law). As discussed
above, this goes to the nature of the boundaries of essential and non-essential. Those who
do not practise in the commercial sphere are unlikely to ‘need’ knowledge of company law.
The LACC Review Questions 
Question 1: 
Question 2: 
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This illustrates the unhelpful nature of framing the question in terms of likely need.
Company law has become increasingly complex and in doing so, has arguably become a
specialist area. In particular, directors’ duties now exist outside the realm of company law
itself, and into revenue law, environmental law, industrial relations, workplace health and
safety etc. It is submitted that these areas can still effectively be studied without an in
depth knowledge of the operation of company law itself. 
While the company may be ubiquitous, the knowledge associated with company law does not
speak to the operation of the legal system as such. If the discipline area of company law
were to be stripped back from the complex regulatory framework, perhaps the key
conceptual knowledge of company law that embodies what the lawyer must know might be
the nature of legal personhood. Traditionally the only compulsory study of the particular
forms of legal personhood has been company law (and perhaps the law of trusts). Other law
relating to legal personhood such as the law relating to children, guardians, attorneys, elder
law and estates are not compulsory. There is therefore no real reason to suggest that
company law should be privileged over any other of these areas. 
Should Statutory Interpretation be included as an Academic Requirement?
It is difficult to agree with the suggestion that an abstracted ‘statutory interpretation’
should become an academic requirement. Indeed, with respect, it is unclear that the LACC
statement on statutory interpretation provides a lot of guidance in how law schools are to
meet the reported deficit in the profession's ability to work with statutes. The element in
the statement that comes closest to a broader framework of working with statutes is item 3
'deploying interpretive techniques'. This highlights the ability to problematise language and
meaning - which goes to the heart of the law.
It would be unusual to find a law degree that does not teach statutory interpretation as the
rules of interpretation. This usually will occur in first year. The question is not whether to
have an academic requirement as a subject, but rather how these skills are expressly
scaffolded through the degree. I refer to this as 'working with statutes' rather than what I
consider to be the somewhat restrictive term of 'statutory interpretation'. The latter focuses
on rules of interpretation and their application, rather than a broader approach to
understanding how to use statutes. 
For example, French CJ in October 2014 pointed out (extra curially) that 
…A strong emphasis on statutory interpretation in the teaching of formal skills
and in working with statutes in subjects which were formally treated largely as
case law subjects. There are few legal problems which come before
practitioners or courts today which do not have a statutory dimension. That is
so whether they present primarily as problems about contracts, tort, property
or equity. 
This suggests that a more suitable approach to inculcate the skills of working with statutes
would be to ensure that traditional ‘case law’ subjects such as contracts, tort, property and
equity are used as the context for learning about statutes and their interpretation. This will
require moving beyond the rules of interpretation into a broader ‘consideration of the
statutory text, context and purpose. That consideration should define the logical framework
of the statute.’
The problem as I see it is not that statutory interpretation (in a rules based sense) is not
taught in law schools - it is. The problem lies in the tradition of using case law as a way of
teaching and learning the law. Understanding law through an adversarial appellate
framework skews our understanding of the essence of the law. There are two elements to
this. One is the almost complete omission in academic legal education of learning about the
law as transaction. If we were to turn again to 'what a practitioner needs to know',
transactional law would trump appellate litigation every time. Transactional law
incorporates working with statutes.
The second, related, element is the vision of statute solely through the lens of the court
rather than the other way around.
The emphasis on case law in legal education is known to limit students’ full appreciation of
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the law. There are a number of reasons to shift away from the case law approach, in
addition to the need to engage more fully with statute law. These include the implications
for student wellness and exposing students to appropriate dispute resolution instead of
litigation as the norm in the law.
If there is to be an academic requirement of statutory interpretation, it must allow for the
skill to be developed in context, throughout the degree. Working with statutes involves a lot
more than application of rules of interpretation and academic experience in discovering,
comprehending, manipulating and applying the language of this principal source of law is
necessary. Indeed this broader approach could perhaps inform the framing of the existing (or
revised) academic requirements.
Is any other area of knowledge, not presently included in the Academic
Requirements, now of such basic potential importance to the great majority of
practitioners today, that no law graduate should be permitted to practise
without it?
Again, it would be preferable to pose this question as to whether there is a core element of
the discipline of law that represents an integral aspect of what it means to be a discipline.
The ‘potential importance to practitioners today’ is too contingent a question. 
As observed in the Review, practitioners increasingly specialise in an area of law. On this
basis, perhaps it is arguable that the core subjects should make room for a more diverse
range of electives. This would allow graduates to emerge with a coherent specialty field, in
addition to the core of discipline knowledge.
There is however one area grossly under-represented in the core discipline and that is
welfare law (or poverty law, however it may be described). [Note: I have struggled to name
this area of law. Some have suggested 'social justice law' or 'access to justice law' which does
encapsulate a broader and field of relevant areas. I wondered though if these names did not
quite convey the idea of substantive legal knowledge, as opposed to a conceptual approach
to law (though I also support this approach). I was trying to articulate a substantive area, in
the same way that we use 'commercial law' for a broad range of otherwise specialist areas,
under the one umbrella. Do you have an idea of what this area of law might be called?
Please leave a comment.]  
As has been observed (see also here) the Priestley 11, supplemented often by elective
subjects, privileges private law and a market-based view of practice. At the same time, the
profession is engaged in promoting social justice initiatives including pro bono work.
Community legal centres are struggling for survival in the face of funding cuts and the
justice system is increasingly out of reach for the ordinary person. This is fuelled by the
nature of legal education. Even in a course dedicated to social justice, the Priestley 11 stand
as a monument to private law. 
Introducing an academic requirement of welfare law (or equivalent) would ensure that each
graduate has as a minimum an understanding of the importance of access to justice and a
knowledge base that equips them to contribute to this. Residential tenancies, family
violence, consumer law, social security law and elder law are all areas that affect broad
sections of society. Additionally, these areas tend to be the subject of statute. This would
afford an excellent contextual opportunity for working with statutes, learning about
statutory interpretation and the importance of context. 
To the extent that legal education fails to ensure a minimum standard of knowledge of
welfare law in Australian society, the profession fails to engage constructively in addressing
the recognised challenge of access to justice. This Review offers an important opportunity to
contribute to justice through progressive change.
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